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undeniably will have become a bluewater naval power. The book rounds out
its analysis of China’s coercive maritime
power with appendices written by
experts on the China Coast Guard
and the country’s maritime militia.
Although not all the details of China’s
vision of a “world-class navy” are clear,
McDevitt projects that the PLAN will
outnumber the U.S. Navy in ships
by 2035. As the American advantage
gradually erodes, a deliberate assessment of the strategic situation will
become even more imperative. With
that in mind, the present work, which
consolidates and updates the advances
made in Chinese maritime-strategic
studies, will serve well any professional
within the field. It provides an incisive
complement to Toshi Yoshihara and
James Holmes’s tour de force, Red Star
over the Pacific (2010). McDevitt has
delivered a work both scholarly and enduring, one that will provide a theoretical foothold for understanding China’s
naval development for years to come.
FRANCIS MIYATA

The Day After: Why America Wins the War but
Loses the Peace, by Brendan R. Gallagher. Ithaca,
NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 2019. 308 pages. $32.95.

Brendan Gallagher has written what
will be the best book on this topic
for at least the next several years, and
probably for many more. It should be
required reading for every person within
the U.S. national-security enterprise,
as well as anyone with an interest in
security, postconflict actions, and nation
building. The Day After is excellently
written, academically rigorous, and
convincing. It is a must-read.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2022

Gallagher is a serving lieutenant colonel
(infantry) in the U.S. Army and stands
tall among the rare breed known as
warrior-scholars. He has served seven
tours in Iraq and Afghanistan, including
multiple deployments with the 75th
Ranger Regiment, and currently is a
battalion commander; so much for
establishing his warrior credentials. His
academic bona fides include winning
the General George C. Marshall Award
as the top graduate in his class at the
Army’s Command and General Staff
College and completing a PhD in public
and international affairs at Princeton.
Put simply, Gallagher wants to know
why the United States has dominated
the battlefield in many conflicts, only
to watch subsequent efforts to secure
the peace fail—often dramatically. A
single failure might be brushed off
as a one-of-a-kind event, but when
failures become repetitive, something
is wrong. Clearly the old adage about
the burned hand teaching best does
not apply; rather than learning from a
hand singed by the hot stove, the United
States keeps grabbing for the burner.
It should be pointed out that The Day
After was published before the American
withdrawal from Afghanistan, which
gives an air of prescience to the work.
Gallagher’s introduction lays out his
research with both precision and
passion. Why does the United States
win massive battlefield victories and
seemingly create conditions to achieve
long-lasting, positive change, only to
watch the moment pass, opportunities
dwindle, and failure eventually result?
He also makes it clear that while his
approach is grounded in strong scholarship and academic rigor, his involvement
is not that of a distant inhabitant of the
ivory tower. In his own words: “Most
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of my adult life I have dealt with the
unintended consequences of these wars
and the life-and-death impacts they have
generated. I have invested years of my
life, led infantry units on the front lines,
conducted countless patrols and combat
operations, been in multiple convoys hit
by roadside bombs, and lost valorous
young soldiers under my command. I
feel driven to explore this compelling
topic and to pursue the answers that
have eluded us for too long” (p. 8).
Rather than detracting from his analysis,
Gallagher’s passion to find answers and
get them right improves the product.
Gallagher argues that when it comes
to winning the peace, the United
States suffers from inherent tensions.
The American culture wants to win
quickly and decisively, and U.S. leaders
attempt to deliver. Then we all want to
go home and allow those who survived
to live happily ever after. Planning for
postcombat operations is weak and
overly optimistic. This flies in the face
of both common sense and experience.
The Day After examines four major
case studies: Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq,
and Libya. From these studies Gallagher identifies three pathologies that
contribute to U.S. failure (although he
deems Kosovo a partial success): wishful
thinking, deficient learning, and the underuse of the National Security Council
(NSC). Wishful thinking is present in
all the cases, from an assumption that
the Kosovo conflict would be over in a
matter of days to the belief that, having
defeated Saddam Hussein, it would be
a simple matter for the victors to hand
over postwar matters to a new Iraqi
government and the United Nations. As
the cases accumulate, it becomes ever
more clear that rather than recognizing
the mistakes and errors committed in
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past efforts and truly learning from
them, even when those efforts were
successes, it became easier for American
leaders to assume they knew better than
their predecessors and therefore would
perform better. This led to repeated
mistakes, such as failing to take full
advantage of State Department expertise.
Gallagher’s concluding chapter is
excellent. Some of his recommendations relate directly to his identified
pathologies. The NSC should be used
as an arena for refining ideas, and
sharp-edged disagreements may be
required to identify realistic goals and
objectives. The commonly experienced
high levels of initial optimism should
be guarded against, if not mistrusted.
More than lip service must be given to
the concept of the “whole of government.” Above all, the question of “What
happens next?” when military victory
has been won or regimes are being
changed must be answered fully. To
fail to do so is all too likely to result in
all-too-familiar patterns of failure.
RICHARD NORTON

Fighting the Fleet: Operational Art and Modern
Fleet Combat, by Jeffrey R. Cares and Anthony
Cowden. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
2021. 184 pages. $24.95.

Sun-tzu often is credited with the
following: “Victorious warriors win first
and then go to war.” In Fighting the Fleet,
the authors Jeffrey Cares and Anthony
Cowden—retired Navy captains and
defense-industry thought leaders—make
a compelling case for reenergizing
and refocusing the development
of naval war-fighting strategy and
reinvigorating naval combat training
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